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Summer 1984

CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
AND SIMILAR CASES: GARNER REVISITED
Stephen A. Saltzburg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is frequently asserted that privileges must be narrowly con-

strued, since they operate in derogation of the "search for truth"
undertaken by courts.' Such assertions are made by the highest
court in the land,2 which is cited by lower courts with apparent zeal. 3
This is not to say that the Supreme Court and lower courts never
create new privileges 4 nor adopt an expansive view of established

privileges, for they sometimes do. 5 New privileges struggle to gain
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This article was first presented as the Fourth
Annual Hofstra Law Review Lecture and is now published in a more complete version. It is a
follow-up to an article analyzing corporate attorney-client privilege generally, which appeared
in this Review as part of a symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 12 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 251 (1984).
1. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 73 (MeNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
2. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1983); Doe v.
United States, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., City of
New York, 692 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 818-19
(4th Cir. 1982); Blaubergs v. Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing a limited constitutionally-based Presidential privilege).
5. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (rejecting narrow view of
corporate attorney-client privilege).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:817

acceptance, however,' and established privileges are not immune
from judicial winnowing.7
I have noted elsewhere that it is understandable that judges, especially appellate judges, would strain to limit the scope of privileges.8 Judges hear privilege claims in the course of litigation in
which it appears possible that a party might be denied evidence, perhaps crucial evidence, if a privilege is sustained. No judge is likely to
be enthusiastic about the prospect that a party who might win (or
worse, who should win) if the court could consider all available evidence, might lose as a result of being unable to secure evidence falling within the protective cover of a privilege. Appellate courts generally hear claims only from those litigants who have already lost and
who complain about evidence that might have been obtained. It is
therefore not difficult to understand appellate sympathy for such
litigants.
Judges are not alone in their reluctance to embrace privileges
enthusiastically. Legal commentators since Wigmore have viewed
privileges with suspicion,' and there are few writers who advocate an
expansive attitude toward privileges. 10 Wigmore made the argument
that has carried the day among legal scholars: Privileges involve a
loss of evidence for triers of fact;" that loss imposes costs upon the
judicial system;12 and those costs ought not to be borne unless it can
be demonstrated that the benefits exceed them. 3 Wigmore and other
writers found the costs to be readily apparent and placed the burden
on the advocates of privileges to demonstrate that the benefits sufficiently outweigh the costs so as to justify the privileges.
It might well be too late in the game to suggest that Wigmore
was wrong and that the commentators and courts who quote, cite,
and rely upon him have been misled. Since so many cases and arti6. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to adopt
family member privilege).
7. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (limiting spousal immunity
privilege).
8. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REV.
597, 598-600 (1980).
9. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 73; Ladd, Privileges, 1969 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 555, 557.
10. But see Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 107-15 (1956) (urging an expansive attitude toward
privileges).
1!. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 73.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 2285, at 527.
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cles begin their analyses with the Wigmore four-part balancing
test, 14 a suggestion that it is not well reasoned and that the references to it have been too readily made has the potential to offend so

many people that it might not be worth it. Whether it is worth it or
not will soon be clear, since I begin with the assertion that Wigmore
was wrong--demonstrably wrong.
I do not suggest, however, that Wigmore was entirely incorrecL

There are reasons to question whether litigants should be denied
some evidence when privilege claims are raised. Nevertheless, Wig-

more made the mistake of focusing almost exclusively on balancing
at the time of litigation, after privileged communications have already occurred (an ex post approach), 15 and paid insufficient attention to the time before privileged communications have transpired
(an ex ante approach). 1 6 Despite this fact, few have questioned Wigmore's focus and, as a consequence, it has dominated the law of
evidence.

I start my discussion with an explanation of the deficiencies in
Wigmore's analysis.17 I then move to a discussion of attorney-client
privilege and explain why it is justifiable.1 8 In the course of this explanation, I offer a rationale for the privilege and then briefly review
why this rationale is essential for determining the proper scope of
14. Wigmore's balancing test is as follows:
Generalprinciple of privileged communications. Looking back upon the principle of
privilege, as an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony
upon all facts inquired of in a court of justice, and keeping in view that preponderance of extrinsic policy which alone can justify the recognition of any such exception . . . four fundamental conditions are recognized as necessary to the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of communications:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be recognized.
Id. Indeed, the most important case cited herein, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), begins its discussion of the merits of a
corporate attorney-client privilege claim in a shareholder suit with Wigmore's balancing test.
Id. at 1100.
15. I develop this point at greater length in Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 600 n.9, 605-12.
16. See id.
17. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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attorney-client privilege for corporations and other entities. 19 Only
when this is done can I then delineate the appropriate parameters of
the corporate attorney-client privilege in shareholder and similar
suits. During my analysis of this issue, I challenge the wisdom of the
seminal case, Garner v. Wolfinbarger,20 and argue that Garner took
the wrong path, which most courts have mistakenly followed ever
since.
II. THE COSTS OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Some clients seek legal advice or legal services from a lawyer
because they are concerned about possible liability, criminal or civil,
for events that have happened or might happen. Other clients seek
legal assistance in bringing claims or in instituting proceedings to
vindicate legal rights and to obtain compensatory or remedial relief.
There are also clients who retain lawyers to provide services that
have nothing, or almost nothing, to do with initiating, defending, or
avoiding litigation.
For purposes of this discussion, the last class of clients is excluded. Those who seek legal assistance without contemplating involvement in, or actually becoming involved in, subsequent legal proceedings, litigation, or investigations generally receive no protection
from the attorney-client privilege, for the privilege is triggered only
when some tribunal seeks to discover the lawyer-client communications. If the client correctly believes that no tribunal will ever make
the quest, there will be no reason for the client to rely upon or invoke
the privilege. Of course, clients who are not involved in formal proceedings might well have as strong a desire as other clients to keep
private any information they communicate to their lawyers and any
details about what the lawyer has done or has been asked to do. The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility 2 ' and general principles
of fiduciary duty provide this privacy by imposing obligations upon
lawyers to protect their clients' secrets and trust.22 Lawyers are thus
19. This rationale is set forth at greater length in my article on corporate attorney-client
privilege generally, Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A

Suggested Approach, 12

HOFSTRA

L.

REV.

279 (1984).

20. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, 56
F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).

21.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Canon 4 (1980). See also MODEL

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
22. See Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974); Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d
668, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Hughes v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 663, 666 (N.D. 11. 1983); Financial Gen. Bankshares,
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subject to discipline and liability for revealing any of their clients'
confidential information. These client protections are related to, but
independent of, the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. It is conceivable that a system might compel lawyers to supply to a tribunal
information about their services, while merely barring lawyers from
extrajudicially volunteering the same information. Nevertheless, our
system happens to protect clients, both in and out of legal proceedings, with the evidentiary privilege as well as the general nondisclosure obligation imposed upon lawyers. My focus in this discussion
will be solely on the privilege and, therefore, solely on clients who
might have occasion to rely upon it.
Consider the position of a client who has some reason to believe
that litigation, other proceedings, or an investigation might occur
and that a tribunal might focus its attention upon the client. It is
reasonable, even prudent, for the client to take steps to be in the best
possible position before the tribunal. One step is to avoid saying or
doing things that might produce an adverse reaction from the tribunal. If there were no privilege covering communications between client and lawyer, and if lawyers could freely be called to give testimony as to everything their clients said or did during the
professional relationship, a client would be well advised to say and
do nothing that, if later disclosed, might be taken in a negative light.
It is possible that clients might disclose to lawyers almost none of the
information so freely disclosed in a privileged setting. Moreover, it is
not only possible, but extremely likely, that clients would resist disclosing things that would appear to them as most apt to hurt them if
discovered by others.2
Lawmakers, therefore, make a judgment when they establish an
attorney-client privilege: they decide that they want to encourage clients to disclose information to their attorneys and that the privilege
works to provide that encouragement. It is undeniably true that not
only are we uncertain about what information clients would reveal to
lawyers if there were no privilege, but we would be equally hardpressed to prove that clients actually communicate more fully because there is a privilege. Moreover, we probably shall never know
exactly what impact the privilege has upon willingness to communicate, because the privilege is of such vintage that no experiment in
doing without it is to be expected. Hence, judgments about the effiInc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 762 (D.D.C. 1981).
23. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4-5, 35-36
(1975) (describing specific problems that arise when clients withhold information).
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cacy of the privilege in promoting communications must be intuitive,
and lawyers' feelings about the privilege are largely affected by their
own contacts with clients as well as by anecdotal reports from other
lawyers.
Thus, as a result of having the privilege, lawyers can inform
their clients that what they communicate in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal services is generally privileged and will not be
disclosed without the clients' consent. Therefore, lawyers are able to
use the privilege to make their clients feel comfortable, and to suggest to their clients that they should speak freely without concern
about suffering adverse effects as a result of having spoken. Clients
can rely on this confidentiality when they speak to their counsel.
If the lawmakers who created the privilege are correct, clients
will tell lawyers things that they might not otherwise say without a
privilege. Thus, the privilege will actually generate communications
that might never be made but for the existence of an attorney-client
privilege. It is necessary to repeat that, absent a privilege, no one can
prove these communications would have been suppressed. On the
other hand, no one can prove the opposite either. The adoption of the
privilege represents an educated guess about behavior. If it is a correct guess, then Wigmore is wrong in saying that the privilege is in
derogation of the search for truth. He is wrong because he assumes
that without the privilege the communications would have been exactly the same, which is the very assumption that lawmakers reject
in adopting the privilege. Wigmore's mistake, as previously noted,
was focusing exclusively on the impact of the privilege at the time of
litigation. If we focus on how the privilege operates at the time that
the lawyer and client meet, however, it is apparent-at least if there
is any merit to the assumption regarding what causes lawmakers to
create the privilege-that additional communications are generated
as a result of having the privilege. Yet, whether these communications actually will result in more evidence being presented to a trier
of fact is another question. The client's right to claim the privilege
means that the additional communications might never be disclosed.
Nevertheless, the client can waive the privilege and it is, therefore,
possible that the additional information may ultimately be disclosed.
In addition, at the very least, it is likely that in some cases a more
complete and accurate version of the facts will be presented by a
lawyer whose client is forthright than by a lawyer whose client hides
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facts.24
Whether disclosed or not at the time of litigation, no tribunal
can demonstrate that had the client been denied a privilege, the additional communications would exist. The assumption of the privilege
is that they would not. This means that no one can demonstrate that
the attorney-client privilege causes a tribunal to lose evidence that
would have been available to it were there no privilege. Upholding
an attorney-client privilege claim signifies only that what is created
through the privilege can be protected by it. In fact, even where clients do invoke the privilege they may still be compelled to answer
questions, during discovery or other legal proceedings, about information of which they have knowledge; they may also be called upon
to produce evidence they possess that might have bearing upon the
dispute.2 5 The privilege only protects the actual communications between clients and their attorneys.26 Of course, individuals might be
able to claim another privilege, such as the privilege against selfincrimination, 7 which authorizes them to withhold from a tribunal
information they possess. But if that other privilege can be claimed
after the individual becomes a client, it could have been claimed
before, and is not, therefore, enhanced by the recognition of an attor28
ney-client privilege.
This discussion demonstrates that when the attorney-client privilege is properly understood, it reaches communications that are presumed to have been made precisely because the privilege exists. No
tribunal is denied any evidence that it definitely would have been
able to obtain simply because the privilege is recognized. It is not
accurate, therefore, to say that the privilege operates in derogation
of the search for truth. Such a statement focuses on the post-communications time period, while it is important, in understanding the
privilege, to focus on the period before the communications are
made.
24.

See id.

25. The Supreme Court makes a similar point in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 395 (1981) ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect

disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney . . .
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.
...).
28. That the attorney-client privilege neither adds to nor subtracts from the privilege

against self-incrimination is evident in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976)
(compelled production of client's papers held by attorney does not implicate client's fifth

amendment privilege from being compelled to produce them himself).
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Thus, Wigmore tended to be too sweeping in his statements
about privileges. He failed to distinguish the attorney-client privilege
from those privileges that do deny tribunals evidence-evidence that
plainly would be available without a privilege. The privilege against
self-incrimination, for example, gives a person a right to refuse to
answer any questions that might tend to incriminate him in any
criminal proceeding. A criminal defendant has the right not to be
called by the government to testify against himself, and the government may not comment upon his choice.2" The privilege against selfincrimination denies the government the testimony of a witness that
would be available but for the privilege.30 Similarly, the spousal privilege, which authorizes either a criminal defendant or his spouse
called to testify against him to claim a privilege, denies the government the witness-spouse's testimony3 l and, thus, makes an otherwise
available witness' testimony inaccessible to a tribunal. These privileges are different from the attorney-client privilege. In contrast,
they plainly remove from a tribunal's consideration evidence it would
have access to but for the privileges. a2
It is this difference-the fact that the attorney-client privilege
covers only that which it creates-that accounts for the absolute nature of the privilege and its applicability in virtually all tribunals.
Thus, the attorney-client privilege, unlike some other privileges, is
not costly when it is properly confined to communications made as
part of a legitimate attorney-client relationship. It may become
costly, however, when it is extended beyond the rationale that supports it.33
III.

CREATING INCENTIVES FOR COMMUNICATIONS

As previously demonstrated, the attorney-client privilege exists
to create incentives for clients to communicate with their lawyers.
Since clients can confidently rely on the privacy of the relationship
29.

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), bars comment on the exercise of the

defendant's right not to testify.
30.

1 make no suggestion here that we should presume defendants to be guilty, and only

suggest that it is obvious that a defendant, whether guilty or innocent, has a story to tell. That
story is withheld from the government unless the defendant agrees to tell it.

31.

See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).

32.

Unlike the attorney-client privilege, these privileges are not extended to encourage

communications. The criminal defendant, for example, is not afforded the fifth amendment
privilege to encourage him to say or do things he would not without protection of the privilege.

The same can be said about the spousal privilege. See infra § III.
33. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at § V.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss4/1

8

Saltzburg: Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and
1984]

CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

and risk nothing by being candid with counsel, they have reason to
disclose as fully as possible everything they know that pertains to the
services they seek. It is but one of several legal devices that have
been created to encourage communications. The informant's privilege, which permits the government to protect the identity of an informant who has supplied information, is another. 34 Without this
privilege, knowledgeable persons, fearful that identification might result in loss of employment or in physical harm, might keep their
information to themselves.
The procedural and. evidentiary rules adopted by American
courts and legislatures provide incentives not only for clients and certain witnesses to provide information, but they also create incentives
for lawyers and investigators to seek out information from those who
have it. The most important rule in this regard pertains to work
product.35
The work product rule affords lawyers and other persons working for the lawyer on a client's case a qualified right to withhold
from discovery materials they obtain in the course of their investigations, where the investigations are the result of foreseeable litigation.36 The work product concept differs from the attorney-client
privilege in two main respects. The work product rule can offer more
sweeping protection than the attorney-client privilege because it covers not only statements from a client to his attorney, but also any
information obtained from outside witnesses as well. 37 At the same
time, however, the work product doctrine offers less protection than
the attorney-client privilege because, unlike the privilege, it is limited to situations in which litigation was reasonably foreseeable when
the statements were obtained 38 and, more importantly, it is not an
absolute protection; 39 a party may discover his opponent's work prod34. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Wirtz v. Continental Finance &
Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

36. Id. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
38. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864-65 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1962); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,
693 (10th Cir. 1968); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
39. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (exception for good cause shown). Some aspects
of work product might receive almost absolute protection-e.g., mental impressions of counsel.
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981); See also Saltzburg, supra note
19, at 297 & n.105.
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uct upon a showing of good cause. 4°
The difference between the privilege and the work product doctrine is vitally important. Although both are part of our adversary
tradition and tend to provide incentives for communications and investigation, they rest upon different assumptions and provide incentives to different groups. The privilege is addressed to clients, while
the work product rules are addressed to lawyers and other agents.
IV.

INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The attorney-client privilege has as its roots the consultation by
a natural person with counsel. 41 It is no shock in a society in which
so much responsibility is borne by various forms of business entities
and government agencies that they too have successfully sought to
avail themselves of the protection associated with the privilege. 42
Courts are divided, however, as to how and to whom the privilege
should apply in the corporate and governmental context.43 I have
suggested elsewhere that in order to determine the proper scope of
the corporate attorney-client privilege one must begin with the privilege's rationale. 4 As the previous discussion explained, the thrust of
the privilege is to create incentives for communications. Clients who
might hesitate to talk candidly with counsel ought not to hesitate
when the privilege attaches. In the corporate context, this rationale
suggests that the privilege ought to attach to statements by those
corporate individuals who are extended a guarantee of confidentiality
in order to encourage them to be forthright in communicating with
corporate counsel. 45 A corporate employee, who lacks authority to
decide whether or to whom his communications to the corporation's
attorney will be disclosed, is obviously not guaranteed confidentiality.
40. See Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29, 33 (D. Conn. 1969);
Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28, 30 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Goldner v. Chicago & N.W.
R. Sys., 13 F.R.D. 326, 329 (N.D. III. 1952); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). For a further discussion of how the incentives relate to the work product rule see Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 302-

304.
41.
DENCE

See generally, C.

MCCORMICK,

MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

Evi-

§ 87, at 175 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).

42. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (corporate privilege);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) (government privilege); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (government

privilege).
43.

The different approaches courts have used are discussed in Saltzburg, supra note 19,

at 288-95.
44. Id. § V.
45. Id.
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Therefore, such a person's communications ought not to be privileged.46
For example, a corporate employee's communications ought not
to be privileged if (1) the employee is ordered to meet with a lawyer
hired by the corporation to conduct an investigation-for instance,
into improper payments to foreign government officials;417 (2) the employee speaks with the lawyer without any understanding that the
lawyer represents anyone but the corporation; and (3) the employee
does not have the authority to control the subsequent use of his
statements. After all, this employee cannot be said to be giving information that he might not have given absent a privilege, since the
communications to counsel are not preceded by any guarantee that
what the employee says will not be used to his disadvantage. A person obviously willing to make, or at least in a position where he
might find it difficult to resist making,48 statements without a promise of confidentiality is exactly like any nonclient witness who is
asked questions by a lawyer or another representative of a client.
The questioner might have reason to be concerned about the ultimate revelation of the answers the employee gives, but this concern
gives rise to work product protection, not the protection of the attorney-client privilege.49
This analysis leads to an approach that is narrower than many
advocates of corporate privilege would prefer.5" Although it is different from the approach used thus far by the Supreme Court,5" the
suggested approach gives corporations and other entities the protection that they can fairly claim and no more. They cannot properly
argue for a broader approach, since affording privileged status to
communications made without any guarantee of confidentiality for
the speaker would remove evidence from the reach of tribunals without promoting the communications in the least. This would result in
an unjustified loss of evidence.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-87 (1981).
See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 303.
Id. at 295-304.
For examples of approaches that suggest protecting more employee statements, see 2
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T 503(b)[04] (1982).
51. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (rejecting the control group
test but declining to set forth a different test) (discussed in Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 29195).
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THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE IN SHAREHOLDER SUITS

The analysis offered thus far suggests a somewhat more narrow
corporate attorney-client privilege than the Supreme Court has previously used and most writers have advocated."2 Application of this
approach to shareholder suits against their corporations, however,
suggests that the trend toward winnowing the privilege in these particular actions is undesirable. In shareholder suits, the analysis calls
for a broader privilege than many courts have afforded. 53 My belief
is that the landmark decision in Garner v. Wolfinbarger54 was well
intentioned, but wrong, and that subsequent cases that have followed
it have lost sight of what the privilege is supposed to do.
Garner is of fundamental importance and is, therefore, considered first. After revealing its deficiencies, I propose that the Garner doctrine is unnecessary to protect shareholders. I conclude by
suggesting that some post-Garner decisions that extend the Garner
rule to fiduciary relationships not involving corporations and shareholders suffer from the same error as Garner.
Garner truly was a seminal case. It marked the first time that a
federal court of appeals gave careful consideration to the scope of
attorney-client privilege in an action by corporate shareholders
against their corporation. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama rendered the first opinion in the
case, 56 which took up less than two columns of one page in the Federal Supplement. In fact, the list of lawyers in the case equalled the
length of the opinion. The court noted that the plaintiffs had requested the President of the First American Life Insurance Co., who
had been counsel for the corporation when the events giving rise to
the litigation occurred, to answer oral interrogatories propounded on
a deposition. The President, who resigned between the time he had
refused to answer the questions and the court's opinion, had invoked
the attorney-client privilege. After noting that counsel could cite
52. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 306.
53. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
54. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, 56
F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
55. It is clear that the court recognized the novel question presented, since it noted that
the district court had found only two English cases on point, and the court of appeals itself
cited no additional authorities dealing with the question presented. Id. at 1101-02.
56. 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated and remanded, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), on remand, 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
Contemporaneously with this initial decision, the district court transferred the case to the
Southern District of Alabama. See 430 F.2d at 1096.
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only two English cases shedding light on the scope of corporate privilege in a shareholder suit, the court concluded, without any extended
discussion, that it was "of the opinion that the privilege here claimed
is not available as against plaintiff stockholders." 57
It is almost axiomatic in law that when the list of counsel equals
the length of the opinion of a lower court there will be an appeal.
And there was in Garner. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit explained the facts in greater detail than did the
district court."" It observed that stockholders of the insurance company had brought a class action alleging violations of the Securities
Act of 1933,11 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,60 Securities and
Exchange Commission rule 1Ob-5, 61 the Investment Company Act of
1940,62 and Alabama law. 3 They asked for relief for the class
against the corporation and its officers. 64 Specifically, they asked to
recover the purchase price that the class members had paid for their
stock in the company. 5 In addition, they claimed that the company
had itself been injured and asserted a derivative action on behalf of
the corporation against various individual defendants. 6
R. Richard Schweitzer was President of the company at the
time of the deposition and previously was counsel for the company
when it issued the stock the plaintiffs bought. 67 The court explained
that at the deposition, the plaintiffs' counsel had asked Schweitzer
about the advice he had given the corporation, the content of discussions between himself and company officials, and the information he
had furnished to the officers, all of which were actions taken during
his role as the corporation's counsel.68 Both Schweitzer and new
counsel for the corporation rendered objections to this questioning
and raised the attorney-client privilege claim. 69
57.
58.
59.

280 F. Supp. at 1019.
See 430 F.2d at 1095-96.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).

60. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). They also alleged common law fraud. Garner, 430
F.2d at 1095.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1982).
63. Securities Act of Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-1 to 8-6-95 (1975 & Supp. 1983); see
430 F.2d at 1095 & n.6.
64. 430 F.2d at 1095.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. He had resigned as President before the district court rendered its decision. 280 F.
Supp. at 1019 n.l.
68. 430 F.2d at 1096.

69. Id. Portions of the court's opinion on appealability, id. at 1096-97, and the choice of
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On the merits, the court began with-what else?-a statement
of the Wigmore test of privileges7 as well as a quotation from Wigmore as to the costs associated with the attorney-client privilege. 71

This beginning led, almost ineluctably, to a narrow view of the privilege.
The court reasoned as follows: The real issue presented was, in

Wigmore's terms, how to balance the corporation's interest in maintaining the privilege against the shareholders' need for evidence.
Management obviously prefers to confer with counsel in private and
to avoid the risk of compelled disclosure of communications. Management, however, does not manage for itself; it manages for the
owners of the corporation, the stockholders. Management has a legitimate interest in exercising reasonable judgment, yet it has no valid
interest in placing an "ironclad veil of secrecy" 71 between itself and
the owners of the corporation. Therefore, the argument made by the

American Bar Association that "the cause of justice requires that
counsel be free to state his opinion as fully and forthrightly as possi-

ble without fear of later disclosure to persons who might attack the
transaction. '73 fails to distinguish between the interests of the client
and the attorney. Furthermore, two exceptions to the privilege-for

communications made in furtherance of a crime74 or fraud 75 and
communications to a joint attorney76-are

useful analogies to a

shareholder exception. 7 The corporation should not lose the privilege
merely because its shareholders sue on its behalf, but
where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges

law, as between state and federal, id. at 1097-1100, receive no attention here. It is only important for me that the court reached the merits of the privilege claim and found that there was a
sufficient federal interest in the securities claim that it would arrive at its own approach to
corporate privilege in the context of this kind of case. Id. at 1100. In a famous footnote, the
Court observed that the district court had not ruled on motions to dismiss the derivative claim
and opined that "our decision does not turn on whether that claim is in the case or out." Id. at
1097 n.1 I. More will be said about this later. See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at I 100.
71. Id. at 1100-01.
72. Id.at 1101.
73. Id.at 1102. The American Bar Association appeared as amicus curiae and supported the privilege claim. Id. at 1097. The Court, however, rejected the ABA argument. Id.
at 1102,
74. E.g., It re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Dec. 18, 1981 and Jan. 4, 1982, 561 F.
Supp. 1247, 1254-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
76. E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 512-13 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
77. See 430 F.2d at 1102-03.
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of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require
that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the
stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.78
The court did not define "cause." Instead, it set forth indicia
that "may contribute to a decision of presence or absence of good
cause." 79 The indicia are:
(1) "the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock
they represent";" °
(2) "the bona fides of the shareholders"; 81
(3) "the nature
of the shareholders' claim and whether it is ob82
viously colorable";
(4) "the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders
having the information and the availability of it from other
sources";8 3

(5) "whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by
the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or
84
of doubtful legality";
(6) "whether the communication related to past or to prospecs5
tive actions";
(7) "whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself";"8
(8) "the extent to which the communication is identified versus
87
the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing";
(9) "the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information
in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons";88

After setting forth these indicia and suggesting that trial courts
could use in camera inspection and protective orders in doing the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1103-04 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

85. Id.
86.

Id.

87. Id.
88.

Id.
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balancing required, 9 the court of appeals vacated and remanded the
case to the district court. 90
The rationale for the attorney-client privilege-that it provides
an incentive for communications that might not take place without
it-is nowhere recognized in the court's opinion. Nor did the court
appear to recognize that any rule of privilege that does not provide
absolute protection for communications from persons who might be
affected by possible disclosure cannot help but reduce the incentive
for communications. Moreover, the court's indicia are so vague as to
make it almost impossible for management to know when the statements they make to counsel might be revealed." Even worse, it is
not self-evident why these criteria were chosen at all.
Although the court did not number its indicia, I hope that my
use of the numbers will aid in an analysis of the court's indicia. Using the same numbers as above, I consider them seriatim.
1.-Why should it matter whether there is one shareholder or
many? And why should it matter how many shares of stock are
owned? If only one shareholder is smart enough to uncover wrongdoing, is his claim to relief not entitled to the same consideration as
that of any litigant? Moreover, if a court is worried about abuse of
minority shareholders by a majority, arguably it ought to be concerned more about small minorities rather than groups that can muster enough votes to have clout within the corporation.
2.-As for the bona fides of the shareholders, it is difficult to
understand how it is to be determined. As long as a colorable claim
(indicium 3) is made, it would appear that shareholders have a right
to proceed with litigation. Undoubtedly, courts can protect trade
secrets and confidential business information (indicium 9) so that a
suit cannot be used for improper competitive reasons. Aside from
this protection, however, it is unclear what a court should do to assess the motives of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs might intensely dislike management, but does that mean they should receive less protection from
courts than plaintiffs who actually like the defendants they haul into
court?
3.-The colorability of the shareholders' claim ought to receive
consideration on a motion to dismiss, especially a motion to dismiss a
89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91. The Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), specifically emphasized the need for clarity in devising an appropriate attorney-client privilege. Id. at
393.
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derivative action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 92 If a
plaintiff has a colorable claim, can a court really assess degrees of
colorability? If the claim is colorable, but not strong, it is arguable
that any evidence that might strengthen it is more important than if
the case were already certain to win.
4.-Deciding whether it is necessary or desirable for shareholders to have the information can be nothing more than begging the
very question that was presented to the district court. All successful
attorney-client privilege claims deny litigants access to confidential
communications. The existence of the privilege represents a judgment that it is sometimes desirable to provide incentives for communications and to permit the communicator to keep his statements private. The need for evidence identified by the court in Garner is no
different from any litigant's need for evidence, and the court fails to
explain why this need should receive special consideration in shareholder actions. As for availability of the same information from alternative sources, it is doubtful that the same information-i.e., candid communications to counsel-will ever be available. That is why
the plaintiffs wanted discovery and why corporate officers do not
want their private communications revealed.
5.-If the attorney-client relationship were used by the client to
perpetrate a crime or a fraud, a well-established exception would be
triggered. 93 Should a lesser showing be required of shareholder
plaintiffs than of other plaintiffs? The court appears to suggest that
a lesser showing is required, although it never says why it makes the
suggestion.
6.-The rationale of the privilege suggests that communications
about past actions or future actions might be inhibited if those actions could give rise to litigation and the communications could be
disclosed. Why should there be a special distinction between past
and prospective actions in shareholder suits, when there is no such
distinction in any other suits? The court provides no answer.
7.-Apparently, the court was unwilling to allow the plaintiffs
to discover communications concerning the very litigation that they
92.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.

93.

E.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (crime); In re Grand

Jury Subpoenas dated Dec. 18, 1981 and Jan. 4, 1982, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1254-55 (E.D.N.Y.

1982) (fraud); cf. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
236 (1972) (rule 503, defining lawyer-client privilege, incorporates exception from privilege for
services obtained in furtherance of crime or fraud) (not enacted).
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commenced.14 This might be an equalizing approach, since plaintiffs
would certainly claim the privilege as to their communications with
their own lawyer. Under the court's approach, however, it is unclear
why the plaintiffs should not be able to discover what the defendants
are saying if the corporate attorneys represent the owners as well as
management; the plaintiffs have a colorable claim; the defendants'
conduct appears to have been problematic; and they continue to seek
advice from the corporation's lawyer. After all, as the court reasoned
earlier,9 5 management would then be using the corporation's lawyer
against its owners.
8.-The court tells us that fishing expeditions are to be avoided;
yet, it is not clear why. If the other indicia favor the plaintiffs and if
corporate counsel is their counsel too, why should they be limited
when their need to fish might be a product of the defendants'
secrecy?
9.-It is unclear why protection of trade and commercial secrets
should be weighed in this balance rather than be treated separately
as they would be if no attorney-client privilege were involved. 96
These indicia governed the litigation as it returned to another
district court on remand. 7 The court examined the indicia and to no
one's surprise found that good cause for discovery had been shown.98
In addition, most of the post-Garnercases that have resulted in opin99
ions have reached the same conclusion.
Before further examining Garneron remand, there are some aspects of attorney-client privilege law that ought to be stated. The
following is a list of several well-established doctrines that may operate to limit the breadth of the attorney-client privilege. After this list
is set forth, I conclude that not only is there no need for an additional Garner exception, but that recognizing such an exception
would be detrimental to legitimate corporate interests.
94.

It is not entirely clear whether the court means in indicium seven communications

about the subject matter of the litigation or merely the strategies of the litigation. If the court

was referring to the communications concerning the very conduct involved in the litigation, it
would appear that the shareholders' need for discovery of such communications would be

stronger. The very fact that this indicium is subject to interpretation, however, undermines the
Supreme Court's call for clarity in devising an appropriate attorney-client privilege. Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
95. 430 F.2d at 1101-04. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
96.

Cf. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 249

(1972) (rule 508 creates independent privilege for trade secrets) (not enacted).
97.

56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).

98. Id. at 504.
99. See Infra notes 137-164 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss4/1

18

Saltzburg: Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and
19841

CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

First, it is important that the corporation holds the privilege and
is free to waive it even though waiver might work to the disadvantage of current or past officers or employees. This means that in circumstances in which it appears that corporate officers have hurt the
corporation, even though the officers might have relied upon the privilege in communicating with counsel, the corporation may waive the
privilege. If some officers or directors are suspected of wrongdoing,
they might be disqualified from participation in the decision-making
concerning any investigation into their conduct. l 00 Thus, the privilege might be waived without their participation. Furthermore, if officers have "taken the money and run," there is every reason for the
corporation to deny them any benefit that they might derive from
the privilege. Of course, it is possible that a majority of shareholders
and their chosen surrogates could take unfair advantage of a minority by controlling the privilege and avoiding waiver. In many cases,
nevertheless, the ability to waive the privilege offers the corporation
and its shareholders protection against wrongdoing. 1°1
Second, in order to claim the privilege, the corporation must be
able to make a showing that the representatives who spoke to counsel
did so in confidence for purposes of securing legal, as opposed to
business, advice. 102 The attorney-client privilege only protects communications that are made as the client seeks legal services, for these
are the communications that the rationale for the privilege assumes
might not be made absent a privilege. 10 3 To the extent that the lawyer participated in meetings in which marketing or other business
strategies were discussed, the privilege is unlikely to attach to those
meetings. 04
Third, the privilege will not necessarily extend to all documents
that the lawyer prepares for the corporation. The justification for
protecting the lawyer's materials under the privilege is that their revelation might be tantamount to revealing client communications,
100. See generally Kirby, New Life for the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in
Shareholder Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 174, 177 (1983) (independent directors might do
investigation).
101. The fact that corporations may choose not to waive the privilege is some evidence
that they want corporate officers to rely upon the privilege and to know that their confidential
communications will not be readily revealed.
102. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 283-285.
104. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Dec. 19, 1978, 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d
Cir. 1979).
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since the lawyer and client communications may be intertwined.10 5
Where legal documents prepared for the corporation are not so inter-

twined, however, discovery of the lawyer's work could be obtained.
Of course, some research done by the lawyer will be protected by the
work product rule, but only if litigation was pending or anticipated
when the information was compiled." 6
Fourth, the privilege generally will not bar questions about fees
paid to counsel.10 7 Nor will it prevent inquiry into whether legal advice was sought in connection with certain transactions when a claim
is made that failure to secure such advice amounted to an actionable
wrong. 108
Fifth, former and current corporate officials can be asked,
through depositions or interrogatories, about the facts that they
knew or did not know at the time they took or failed to take certain
actions. The extent to which they were knowledgeable or ignorant is
not something protected by the privilege; all that is protected is specifically what they said to counsel in the process of seeking legal
services.10 9

Sixth, if the corporation claims advice of counsel as a defense,
the privilege is lost. In many cases, the corporation must use this

defense and thus abandon the privilege.110 The law is not as clear as
to whether an individual officer may reveal otherwise privileged communications when she wishes to use advice of counsel as a defense in
a suit against her individually for actions taken in her official corporate capacity. I would think, however, that the corporation would be

estopped from preventing the official from defending herself."1 Since
105. Cf. Attorney-Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1977)
(court reviews each document for which privilege is claimed to ascertain whether disclosure
would reveal client communications).
106. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d
511, 515 (1980). But see United States v. Lawson, 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Saltzburg, Communications
Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IowA L. REv. 811, 826-27 (1981) (details of
attorney-client relationship rarely "amount to information conveyed by the client in order to
obtain the legal services that are sought by the client").
108. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 384
F.2d 316, 317 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 603
(N.D. Tex. 1981); Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 377 Mass. 772, 775, 388 N.E.2d 658, 661
(1979).
109. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
110. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 721 (N.D. 11. 1978).
I ll. Cf. In re Friend, 411 F. Supp. 776, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (lawyer entitled to disclose privileged documents to grand jury in order to defend himself).
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the corporation established the officer-lawyer relationship and encouraged the officer to seek legal advice, it would be difficult to defend a decision that denied the officer, when sued civilly or prosecuted criminally, the opportunity to explain her actions. If legal
standards of liability permit officers to be sued individually for their
corporate behavior, there is every reason to permit them to raise defenses afforded them by law and little reason to permit the corporation to deny them evidence in their defense.
Seventh, once a party makes a prima facie showing that the
client-in the corporate context, this would mean those persons
whose communications fall within the privilege-attempted to use
the lawyer in furtherance of a crime or a fraud, or what the client
reasonably should have known was a crime or fraud, the privilege
vanishes. 112 For example, the prima facie showing can be made in
shareholder actions by evidence that a prospectus contained misleading information. Any objective facts that appear to call into question
representations or actions by corporate officers might be enough to
require a trial court to examine otherwise privileged communications
in camera."13
Eighth, although corporate officials might invoke their privilege
against self-incrimination and thereby attempt to deny shareholders
evidence about the state of their knowledge or other information to
which they may be privy, invoking the privilege in a civil action in
which they are named as defendants could be quite costly: Their
privilege claim can be used as evidence against them." 4 Moreover, it
is possible that the officials could lose their attorney-client privilege
altogether, since a court might rely on an adverse inference as prima
facie evidence that the communications between the officials and
counsel were in furtherance of a crime or fraud.
Each of these aspects of attorney-client privilege applies to all
cases, regardless of whether they are shareholder suits. Thus, when
the limitations on the privilege are fully understood, the argument
for a special rule for shareholder suits appears to be weak. At this
point, however, the question might be asked whether there is any
reason to worry about the additional disclosure that might result
from the Garner approach, given the many ways in which shareholders might already obtain communications between corporate officials
112. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
113. Garner recognized this. 430 F.2d at 1104. See supra text accompanying note 89.
114. Cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976) (permitted adverse inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence at disciplinary proceedings).
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and counsel.
There is a reason-a good one. It is true that corporate officers
act not for their own benefit, at least not in theory, 115 but for the
benefit of the shareholders who own the company. It is also true that
corporate counsel owes a duty to the corporation and all its shareholders, not to specific officials. Thus, there is a superficial attraction
to Garner'sidea that all of the various people who make up a corporation, including its owners, should share in any communications
made on the corporation's behalf with its counsel. There is a problem, however, with this idea, which the Garnercourt failed to appreciate: Corporate officers know that in a complex world of federal and
state regulation of corporate activities they are always subject to suit
as a result of any decision that they make. Any corporate document
might be challenged as incomplete or misleading. Any decision could
be challenged as wasteful or self-serving. Although doctrines like the
business judgment rule afford some measure of protection" 6 and enable officials to preclude some litigation, it is easy to understand why
corporate officials would be concerned about possible suits naming
them as defendants.
Some of these suits may be derivative actions, in which there
are also various doctrines that afford breathing room for officials." 7
Nevertheless, simply being named as a defendant might require officers to hire separate counsel" 8 and to go through motions and some
personal suffering before finally vindicating themselves. Corporate
officers who are concerned about being named as defendants have as
much reason as any other individuals to fear the use of their communications to counsel against them. Although I do not suggest that the
officers are consulting with counsel in their individual capacities, I do
115. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders'
Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1745-47 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1198 (1981);
H. SOWARDS, CORPORATION LAW §§ 8-86 (1974).
116. See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 482-83
(1970).
117. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring demand in derivative actions); see Zilker v.
Klein, 510 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (applicability of rule 23.1 demand in derivative
action); Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 943 (1982) (reviewing
the special litigation committee).
118. Some commentators suggest they must have separate counsel. E.g., Neal &
Thompson, Vulnerability of Professional-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 31 Bus.
LAW 1775, 1784 (1976). Even if separate counsel is reimbursed by the corporation, the burden
of litigating a case can be substantial.
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suggest that when they consult with counsel they know that their
communications could be damaging to both the corporation if it is
sued and to them as individuals if they are sued. Once this point is
understood, it is clear that a choice must be made: Either corporate
officials are to be given an incentive (which is what the privilege is
all about) to talk freely without fear of how their statements might
be used by third persons, or they are to understand that there is little
security for their statements to counsel and that disclosure is a real
possibility.
Garner fails to acknowledge the need to choose, but the effect of
the decision is to have made a choice-the wrong choice. The first
option-to protect, as in any other case, communications between
corporate officials and counsel-permits officials to talk candidly, to
discuss problems and concerns honestly, and as a result, to make the
decisions that they believe are best for the corporation based upon
counsel's advice. At the same time, however, the facts and data upon
which decisions are based would not be privileged. Nor would the
business reasons for decisions be privileged. In contrast, the second
option-not to protect such communications-denies the comfort of
the privilege and informs officials that they should be reluctant to be
open and forthright with the corporation's counsel, for their communications may come back to haunt them in subsequent litigation. The
effect, I fear, is that the corporation will suffer because it will lose
the capacity for unrestrained candor in attorney-client communications that the privilege assumes to be so valuable.
As a basis for creating this shareholder exception to the privilege, the Garner court analogized to the exception for communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. " 9 As noted above, I
would apply the crime or fraud exception in shareholder actions the
same way it is applied in other actions. If the prima facie test works
in cases in which persons other than shareholders sue a corporation,
it is not readily apparent why it should not be sufficient in shareholder suits.
The joint client exception might seem to be a better analogy,
though only at first glance, since further examination reveals that
the analogy is seriously flawed. Under the joint client exception, the
attorney-client privilege will not attach when two clients share a lawyer in seeking legal assistance (assuming that there is no conflict
barring this joint representation) and subsequently oppose each other
119.

430 F.2d at 1102-03.
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in litigation in which communications to their lawyer by one or both
of them are relevant.1 20 Crucial to the joint client situation is the
notion that the clients enter into the arrangement having agreed that
they are sharing the lawyer and the lawyer's services. As between
equal partners there is no reason to prefer the one who wants to
invoke the privilege over the one who wants to waive it. Evidence
writers suggest that the partners intended that the privilege not attach to disputes between them, 12 1 when, in fact, they probably never
thought about what would happen if they had a falling out. Once
they are suing each other, it is difficult to inhibit one from reporting
the other's communications and impossible to prevent each from using the other's communications in preparing for trial. Thus, courts
recognize that disclosure is22likely to result and, therefore, create an
exception to the privilege.'
These same assumptions do not apply, however, in shareholders'
suits against their corporation. By definition, if the corporate privilege is raised, it is because the officers selected by controlling persons
have decided that the corporation is better served by its invocation
than by its waiver. The corporate structure recognizes control and
lack of control. Purchasers of corporate stock know that there will be
decisions on which reasonable people may differ and that their corporation might make decisions with which they do not agree. The
entire structure depends upon those in control having the capacity to
act. If they believe that candid consultation with counsel is in the
corporation's best interest, there is reason to respect the judgment as
much as any other they might make.
My judgment, then, is that Garner was wrong and that the attorney-client privilege in shareholder cases should apply just as it
does in any other litigation. Nevertheless, assuming that the Garner
exception is utilized, I do believe that Garner correctly implied in its
famous footnote that the result should not depend on whether the
suit is derivative (technically on behalf of the corporation) or simply
against officers of the corporation. 123 If a special rule is to be created
that gives shareholders access to corporate officials' communications
to counsel, it must be because the shareholders are viewed as sharing
the right to claim the privilege. And although there is a technical
argument that the derivative suit warrants special treatment because
120.
121.
122.

See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 91, at 189-90.
Id.
E.g., Valente v, Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 369-70 & n.16 (D. Del 1975).

123.

430 F.2d at 1097 n.11. See supra note 50.
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the benefits will inure to the corporation, it is the shareholders who
ultimately seek those benefits. Either shareholders should have the
benefit of a special rule or they should not. Similarly, lines should
not be drawn between shareholders who sue claiming they bought
their stock because of actions by defendants and those who claim
they were already shareholders when they were injured by the defendants' actions.124 Any unique relationship between management and
shareholders that warrants a special rule ought to include any shareholders who claim to have been hurt qua shareholders as a result of
the action of corporate officials.
Having criticized the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garner, I now
focus on the case on remand. 125 As noted above, the district court
found that good cause had been shown by the shareholders and denied the corporate privilege. 261 believe that the decision to deny the
privilege was probably correct on the facts, but not because of the
good-cause reasoning that I criticize. There were several factors present that should have been sufficient to satisfy the prima facie fraud
standard: (1) the shareholders demonstrated that the insurance company engaged in a public offering of stock without registering it with
the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC");127 (2) corporate
counsel had received a letter from the SEC refusing his request for a
"no-action" ruling regarding the offering;' 28 (3) salesmen employed
by the company continued to sell the stock after the SEC staff re2
quested assurances that the public offering would be discontinued;1 9
(4) the prospectuses used to sell the stock contained recitals that
30
Schweitzer's own law firm had considered the legality of the issue;'
(5) the law firm never filed with the state securities commission a
written consent for use of its name in the prospectus; 131 (6) a former
president of the company stated that it was run for the benefit of a
parent company; 32 (7) some defendants had received payments in
connection with the registration of the stock with the state commis124. Some courts have refused to draw the line. E.g., Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D.
480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
125. 56 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
126. Id. at 504.
127. Id. at 503.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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sion; 133 and (8) the defendants had invoked their privilege against
self-incrimination and refused to answer questions in depositions.134
Thus, if these circumstances are sufficient to satisfy the prima facie
fraud standard, there was no need in this case for any special exception for shareholder suits.
Furthermore, even without the prima facie fraud showing, questions to Schweitzer about whether the firm had in fact granted permission for use of its name or whether it had objected at any point to
its use should have been deemed to be beyond the protection of the
privilege. They did not relate to communications made by persons
seeking legal services.' 35 Nor should Schweitzer have been permitted
to rely on the privilege to refuse to answer whether he knew about a
certain option having been granted, unless he could have demonstrated that any answer would require him to disclose communications made in confidence to him, as opposed to revealing information
he might 36have become aware of while representing the
corporation.1
The various Garner opinions might be defended on the ground
that the facts strongly suggested wrongdoing, which the courts did
not want to protect. Although no one would fault the judicial desire
to insure that justice is done, justice could as easily have been
achieved by invoking more typical attorney-client privilege concepts
without creating a doctrine that would take on a life of its own and
threaten legitimate corporate interests.
If courts returned to a careful analysis of the basic rules of attorney-client privilege, they would see that they do not need Garner
to do justice. Consider, for example, the case of In re TransOcean
Tender Offer Securities Litigation,'137 which arose out of a tender
offer by Vickers Energy Corporation ("Vickers"), a wholly owned
subsidiary of Esmark, Inc. ("Esmark"), for the minority shares of
TransOcean Oil, Inc. ("TransOcean"). 13 8 When the tender offer was
initiated, Vickers was the majority shareholder of TransOcean. 3 9
Minority shareholders brought three federal actions and a state
claim, alleging that TransOcean, Vickers, and Esmark, as well as
133. Id. at 502-03.
134. Id. at 504.
135.

See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

136.
137.
138.
139.

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
78 F.R.D. 692 (N.D. III. 1978).
Id. at 693.
Id.
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officers and directors of all three companies, violated federal securities laws and common law fiduciary principles by making false and
misleading representations of material facts in the tender offer circulation. 140 The minority shareholders attempted to obtain discovery,
14
but were confronted with a claim of attorney-client privilege. Of
the ten categories of documents sought, the defendants agreed to
supply only two.' 42 While the court noted that Garner placed the
burden of showing good cause on the plaintiff, 43 it specifically refused to adopt this approach, stating that "[u]nder the circumstances of this case, it is immaterial who has the burden on the good
cause issue."' 4 4 In other words, the court was sympathetic to the
idea that in shareholder actions disclosure of otherwise privileged
communications would be presumed proper, unless the defendants
could show good cause why disclosure should be denied. The court
ultimately found it unnecessaTy to decide who had to show good
cause, since it decided
that under any approach the plaintiffs should
145
disclosure.
obtain
TransOcean is another example of relying on the Garner rule
where no such reliance is necessary. The eight categories of documents that the defendants claimed were privileged covered the original acquisition of a 51% interest in TransOcean by Swift & Company ("Swift"), a predecessor and later a subsidiary of Esmark;
purchases and sales of TransOcean stock by officers of Swift; documents relating to Swift's contemplated secondary offering of its
TransOcean stock; filings by TransOcean with the SEC; transfer of
Swift's TransOcean stock to Vickers; plans never acted upon by
Swift and Esmark to increase or decrease Esmark's interest in
TransOcean; open market purchases of TransOcean stock by Esmark; a proposed agreement involving a natural gas purchase by an
Esmark subsidiary from TransOcean; and documents relating to
purchases and sales of TransOcean stock by officers of Swift. 46
It should be plain that under a proper application of the privilege the defendants would have to answer questions concerning their
purchases and sale of stock; the information they possess must be
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 693 & n.1.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695 & n.2.
430 F.2d at 1103-04.
78 F.R.D. at 696.
Id. at 696-97.
Id. at 695 n.2.
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revealed.1 47 Similarly, the defendants would have to answer questions concerning any facts or data that supported or failed to support
their SEC filing, since such information is not privileged. Moreover,
they would have to answer questions about whether they had made
plans for a secondary offering of stock and had attempted to arrange
the natural gas purchase. They would have to answer all these questions concerning these facts, because the privilege does not cover
what they know, only what they said to counsel. 14 8 Thus, even if the
defendants did not have to produce documents, the minority shareholders could have obtained much discovery. It appears likely, in
fact, that the shareholders could have obtained most, if not all, of
the documents under a standard analysis of the privilege. It is doubtful that many of the documents would have revealed confidential
communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal services.
Thus, the court could have ordered much discovery without relying
on Garner.This is probably true in most of the cases that have relied
upon Garner.The significance of this, of course, is that rejection of a
special rule for shareholder cases is not likely to result in corporate
wrongdoing going undiscovered.
Too many decisions have followed Garner without carefully examining the need for a special rule in shareholder suits. Few courts
have taken the time to observe that shareholders often are denied
access to sensitive corporate information, 1 9 and that denial represents a judgment by the corporate majority that the corporation will
benefit from a certain amount of confidentiality being maintained.
As long as the attorney-client privilege is limited to the rationale
giving rise to it, and the limitations that I have described are applicable, shareholders will not be unfairly treated in litigation even if
Garner is rejected.
VI.

EXTENSION OF

Garner BEYOND SHAREHOLDER SUITS

Since Garner used a fiduciary analysis, it is not surprising that
courts that were quick to follow it in shareholder suits would extend
it to other fiduciary contexts. In Donovan v. Fitzsimmons,"'° for ex147.

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

148. Id.
149. Garner mentioned in a footnote that shareholders had access to some corporate
records, but not all. 430 F.2d at 1104 n.21. That corporate shareholders have some common
law or statutory rights of access to nonprivileged material means they have less, not more,
need than other litigants for discovery against their corporation.
150. 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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ample, the Secretary of Labor .("Secretary") sought discovery in an
action his department had filed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,151 alleging that former officials of a pension fund had violated their fiduciary responsibilities.' 52 The court
relied upon Garner to hold that "it is apparent that the pension fund
trustee analogue to the derivative action is particularly well-suited to
the [Garner] rule's application. ' 153 No one doubts that the Secretary
was well intentioned, but the fact remains that if he is entitled to
invade the lawyer-client relationship, pension fund trustees might be
discouraged from being candid when seeking legal advice. The court
observed that the former trustees, who no longer possessed the right
to claim the privilege, intended to raise advice of counsel as a defense,"' and I believe that they should have been permitted to reveal
confidential communications necessary for their defense. 155 The Secretary would, thus, have had the opportunity to discover those communications. There is, however, no greater reason to adopt a special
rule for pension fund cases than for other cases. Nor is there a reason to deny the current trustees the benefit of the privilege. 151
Yet another unfortunate application of Garner is Quintel Corp.,
N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 157 a suit arising from a real estate transaction. Quintel Corporation, N.V. ("Quintel"), a Netherland Antilles
corporation, was wholly owned by one Gajria. Gajria contracted with
Citibank, N.A. ("Citibank") for purposes of acquiring certain property. Quintel sued Citibank, claiming that Citibank had breached its
fiduciary duty and alleging securities violations, fraud, and negligence. 158 Gajria, on behalf of Quintel, deposed a Citibank vice-president; Citibank objected to numerous questions on attorney-client
privilege grounds. 159 The court stated, of course, Wigmore's test of
attorney-client privilege, 6 0 discussed Garner,'6' and then proceeded
to hold that since it was clear that Citibank was a fiduciary for the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
strate for

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
90 F.R.D. at 584.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 588. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
The current trustees, like corporate officers, might assert the privilege to demonthemselves and for future trustees that confidential communications would not be

readily disclosed. See supra note 101.
157.

567 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

158.

Id. at 1359.

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1359-60.
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360-62.
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plaintiff, "the fiduciary's duty to exercise its authority without veiling its reasons from the grantor of that authority outweighs the
fiduciary's interest in the confidentiality of its attorney's
communications.' 62
Although the court recognized a privilege for communications
163
made before and after Citibank agreed to work with Quintel,' it
would not accept Citibank's argument that it was entitled to claim
the privilege for legal advice sought regarding its fiduciary responsibilities while it was under a duty to the plaintiff. 64 Based on my
previous arguments,'165 I think that Citibank should have prevailed.
The word "fiduciary" has no talismanic quality that dictates abdication of the usual approach to attorney-client privilege whenever
the word is invoked. Those who have fiduciary responsibility often
want legal advice concerning their responsibilities. They should have
the same opportunity to consult with counsel and to speak freely and
without fear of making admissions as any other clients. In Quintel,
the plaintiff could have asked Citibank's officers what they did regarding the purchase, whether they complied with their agreement
with the plaintiff, and any other questions concerning the underlying
facts of the land acquisition that the plaintiff cared to propound.
Permitting Citibank to have a privilege would not interfere with discovery; it simply would treat Citibank like any other person or entity
who has felt the need to seek legal help in confidence. Furthermore,
the plaintiff in Quintel would have been no worse off if Citibank's
privilege claim had been accepted than any litigant who is prevented
from discovering what an opposing party has told his lawyer in
confidence.
A sounder decision than both Quintel and TransOcean is Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 6 a case in
which the Community Trading Future Commission ("Commission")
1 67
sued a brokerage corporation for alleged violations of federal law.
The parties agreed to a consent decree that provided for the appointment of a receiver and an investigation by the Commission.' The
federal district court appointed a receiver who filed a voluntary peti162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1364.
See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 339.
Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss4/1

30

Saltzburg: Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

19841

tion in bankruptcy on behalf of the corporation before he was named
trustee in bankruptcy.169 When the Commission sought to subpoena
records held by a former corporate counsel, counsel invoked, on the
corporation's behalf, the attorney-client privilege. 70 Although the
trustee in bankruptcy agreed to waive the privilege,' 7 ' the court of
appeals held that it was the corporation's directors and officers who
possessed the right to make the waiver decision. 72 This result, I suggest, recognizes the importance of permitting entities, as well as individuals, the opportunity to consult with counsel and to have their
officers feel secure that the consultation is confidential.
VII.

CONCLUSION

An understanding of the incentive effects of the attorney-client
privilege informs decision-making when the privilege is claimed in
new and different settings. I believe that in securing legal advice,
corporations, other entities, and fiduciaries should all be able to
claim the privilege in situations where they can demonstrate that
persons communicating with counsel have reason to be concerned
about possible disclosure of their communications and that without
the privilege they may be reluctant to give, fully and openly, the
information that their lawyers need to provide intelligent and prudent legal services. Out of respect for the rationale that supports the
privilege, entities should not be permitted to claim the privilege for
communications made by persons who speak without a guarantee of
confidentiality. The work product doctrine will provide sufficient protection for those communications. At the same time that the rationale suggests limits on the scope of employee statements that should
be within the privilege, it also strongly supports the notion that once
the privilege does attach, it should be respected, even though a person seeking to invade it utters the word "fiduciary." Fiduciary relationships may create special duties that require professionals to exercise unusual or special care. That is more, not less, reason to give
fiduciaries full opportunity to consult openly with counsel. The limits
on the attorney-client privilege that apply in all cases work to assure
that litigants have access to facts and other evidence necessary to
expose wrongdoing. The attorney-client privilege should therefore, be
permitted to operate in shareholder and other fiduciary cases as it
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.

172.

Id. at 342-43.
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operates in all other cases. In short, Garner's exception to the privilege should be reexamined and rejected.
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